In this paper, we present an agent-based model to describe the emergence of bilingualism in an artificial language learning communication task as a result of the competition of social conformism (Asch, 1956 ) and bias towards regularization (Smith, Skarebela, & Tamariz, 2010; Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008) . We compare our numerical results with preliminary results from an experiment performed at the LEC in Edinburgh (Tinits, 2012 (Tinits, , 2013 and with results of Lupyan and Dale (2010) and obtain good qualitative agreement.
Motivation
In the recent years, a lot of effort has been put in understanding the emergence of signaling systems. Two main categories of models have been designed: Bayesian learners models, see for example (Griffiths & Kalish, 2007) and evolutionary signaling game models, see for example (Hutteger, 2007; Mühlenbernd, 2011) . In these systems, agents usually learn a conventional communication system, but they don't always succeed (Pawlowitsch, 2008) . One of the issues is that many signaling conventions can arise simultaneously, requiring bilingual agents for the stability of a global communication system. Models that account for bilingualism have been developed recently, see for example (Burkett & Griffiths, 2010) or (Thompson, Roberts, & Smith, 2013) for Bayesian models, see also (Roberts, 2013) , and (Iriberri & Uriarte, 2013) for a game theoretic model.
The aim of this paper is to develop a multilingual agent-based model that accounts for inter-individual interactions. Roberts observed that agents should be able to distinguish and adapt their behavior to their neighbors to realize bilingualism. We will use this idea by associating languages with links between agents. An agent is said to be bilingual (multilingual) if he can use two (or more) languages differentially with respect to his neighbors. In this work we are interested in the resulting evolution of a situation of language contact, not in the whole evolution process of emergence of bilingualism. This relates to the work of Iriberri and Uriarte (2013) who model the evolution of a mixed population of bilinguals and monolinguals and to the work of Lupyan and Dale (2010) who surveyed the influence of social structures on languages.
The idea of our model arose from a discussion about an implementation of an Artificial Language Learning (ALL) experiment as it has been developed at the LEC (Language Evolution and Computation research unit) at University of Edinburgh (Kirby et al., 2008) that investigated the use of miniature artificial languages in small closed groups (Tinits, 2012 (Tinits, , 2013 . In this task, speakers of two similar varieties were given a collaborative communication task to simulate coordination required in situations of language contact. The study demonstrated a trend for a minority speaker to accommodate to the majority if the languages were equally complex; when the minority spoke a simpler variety, however, the speakers did not accommodate; instead, patterns of active and passive bilingualism emerged (Lincoln, 1979) . We claim that the observed behavior is driven by the competition of language simplification (Smith et al., 2010; Kirby et al., 2008) and social conformism (Asch, 1956 ) and test our claim on this ALL experiment.
The model
In order to obtain an agent-based model that is able to account for bilingualism, we use a directed network G := {V, E} of agents v i ∈ V where edges e ij := (v i , v j ) ∈ E are directed in the direction of communication (sender v i towards receiver v j ). Two communicating agents are linked by two edges of opposite orientation. We associate to each of these edges e i,j a probability distribution
. . , N and say that a language L k is associated with an (undirected) edge if P k,i,j = P k,j,i = 1. Establishment of successful communication is described by the convergence to a state in which every edge is associated with a language.
We introduce objective costs c k ∈ [0, 1] of using language L k and assume that the more regular a language is, the smaller its cost. Hence, if c k = 0 the language is costless to use and if c k = 1 the language is very costly to use. The dynamics of the system should reflect, through the learning rule, that more regular languages are favored; this will model the process of regularization. This process has been discussed in (Kirby et al., 2008) and in (Lupyan & Dale, 2010) . Kirby et al. have shown that cultural factors can lead to the regularization of a language. Lupyan and Dale have shown on a vast language survey that languages spoken by larger communities tend to be morphologically simpler than languages spoken by small communities. They explained this fact by arguing that large communities need to have simpler languages because they need to be easier to learn by adults. We will compare our results with their work, since we are modeling a situation where there is a minority and a majority.
Additionally, we associate with every agent v i subjective biases towards a particular language
N which account for social conformism (Asch, 1956 ), habituation to one particular message (lexicalization (Brinton & Traugott, 2005, p.18) ) or any other subjective preference of a particular agent. It describes the tendency of an agent to change the language in case of unsuccessful communication. If β k,i = 0 agent v i will continue to use L k whatever the result of the communication, because of social pressure or personal preferences. If β k,i = 1 agent v i will tend to change the language for the next try if he is able to do so, that is if the other language is not too costly to use. The relevant parameter for agent v i using language L k is therefore c k β k,i . These parameters which describe the overall tendency of a speaker to change language in case of unsuccessful communication will be referred to as penalization parameters.
Game interaction
In order to simplify the presentation, we consider from now on only two languages L 1 and L 2 consisting of word-meaning pairs. We note w k,m the word of language L k that means m. At each step of the simulation, we choose a directed edge e ij , a meaning m, and make the sender v i and the receiver v j play a coordination game G m
Depending on the result, the receiver v j updates his strategy profile P L,j,i by penalizing the unsuccessful language (S stands for success and F for failure). We call P L,i,j a strategy profile because it describes the mixed strategy that player v i uses when playing against player v j . In the case of Eq (1), player v j will penalize language L 1 on the directed edge e ji by reducing P 1,j,i if the outcome of the game is F 21 or S 22 and penalize L 2 otherwise. By doing this, the probability of the successful language is also increased.
Learning rule
The learning rule works as follows: choose an edge e ij , play game G m and update the probability distribution of the listener
This rule penalizes unsuccessful languages and reinforces successful languages using the corresponding penalization parameter c k β k,j ; the bigger the parameter, the greater the penalization. The use of language L k by agent v j is therefore favored by small c k β k,j , as unsuccessful attempts to use this language will be less penalized than unsuccessful attempts in another language L l with a bigger penalization parameter c l β l,j .
Small penalization parameters are due either to small objective costs or to small subjective biases. Therefore, both regularization and social conformism tend to reduce the penalization parameter. The competition between the two effects arise when a minority uses a language which is simpler than the language of the majority. In this case, regularization creates a bias towards the minority language, and social conformism a bias towards the majority language, hence the competition. In such a case, bilingual agents stabilize the system, as they can adapt to the different languages in competition. Note that if the simpler language is spoken by the majority there is no competition and the two effects add up, leading to the propagation of this simple language in the different linguistic minorities.
Modeling of the ALL communication task
The ALL task has been designed to model language simplification when two similar language varieties are in contact. In this task, speakers of two similar varieties were given a collaborative communication task to simulate coordination required in such situations. Depending on how the varieties differ, the overall behavior of the system may differ (Tinits, 2012 (Tinits, , 2013 .
Description of the ALL task
The experiment considered a set of three 9-word languages L 1 , L 2 and L 3 that differ pairwise by exactly two words. The set of languages is such that L 3 is a compositional language where sub-parts of the signal systematically correspond to sub-parts of the meaning. As L 3 is regular, we call it simple and the other two languages will be referred to as complex, as they maximally differ from the simple variant by two words. Three participants V := {A, B, C} will learn two of these languages. Participants A and B will always learn L 1 , referred to as the majority language (MaL), and participant C will learn either L 2 or L 3 , referred to as the minority language (MiL). They will then interact together to reach mutual understanding. Figure 1 shows an example of initial and final condition of an ALL Figure 1 . On the left, initial situation of the ALL task, participants A and B learned L 1 and participant C learned L 2 . On the right, final situation where the languages get attached to the edges, i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}.
task. We see that it can be described by a transfer of language from participants to edges. To describe a final communication state, we will use a triplet ijk corresponding to Figure 1 . We set the index to 1 for the MaL and to 2 for the MiL. For example a final situation 122 means that A and B use the MaL to speak together and the MiL ∈ {L 2 , L 3 } when interacting with C. We refer to the two possible conditions as 1. Complex-Complex (CC): L 1 is the MaL and L 2 is the MiL; 2. Complex-Simple (CS): L 1 is the MaL and L 3 is the MiL.
Numerical experiment
In order to further simplify the model, we restrict ourselves to one particular meaning m for which the word-meaning pairs w i,m , i = 1, 2, 3 differ and drop the m index. Languages can therefore be identified with words. We set c 1 = c 2 = 0.5 and c 3 = 0.1 to reflect the fact that L 3 is more regular that L 1 or L 2 .
In order to show the influence of social conformism on the model we consider two different conditions: a condition with social conformism (C) and a condition without social conformism (nC). As mentioned in section 2, social conformism is encoded in the subjective biases b i .
• Note that β i,k = 1 if agent i doesn't know language L k at the beginning of the simulation. In both cases agents are biased towards the language they have learned and these biases are stronger (smaller values) for the majority and weaker (bigger values) for the minority in the social conformism setup.
In order to be more realistic, we include another condition that models noise (N) in the system. This condition can account for mistakes or any other misproduction. It allows us to interpret the agents as communities where community C uses a more regular language than the two others. This interpretation is important because it makes this simple ALL communication task interpretable in the context of language contact on greater scales. As a result of this interpretation, we will be able to compare our results with those of Lupyan and Dale (2010) . Noise (N) is encoded in P L,i,j . We restrict ourselves to P 1,i,j , because P 2,i,j = 1 − P 1,i,j . An initial condition for P can be represented as
The conditions for 5% noise (N) and no noise (nN) reads 
The results of our numerical experiment are depicted in Figure 2 . The four columns display the results for the different conditions of noise and conformism and each column is divided into two, the left part corresponding to the ComplexComplex setting and the right part to the Complex-Simple setting. The legend indicates which language is dominating. In this experiment, a stable configuration is realized when one of the two languages is associated with one of the three edges. Hence, we have 2 3 = 8 stable configurations. In our experiment only 5 occur, displayed in Figure 2 . For the no noise (nN), no conformism (nC) results, the CC condition ended up in a uniform distribution between four states: the four that have a 1 at the beginning of the configuration meaning that the two majority agents A and B kept speaking L 1 . This result was expected since in this condition the two languages behave the same way whenever the first communication is a failure, which is the case on two of the three edges. This remains true even in presence of noise (N) because the situation is random and the effect of noise is averaged away. For the CS condition, the objective cost c 3 = 0.1 of L 3 is small enough to strongly favor its use. Agents A and B were therefore forced by agent C to learn L 3 , but kept speaking L 1 together; they ended up bilingual, hence the 122 configuration.
Social conformity created, as expected, a bias towards the majority language. This effect is clearly visible in columns 2 and 4 for the CC condition as 90% of the simulations ended up in the 111 configuration, meaning that only L 1 is used. In the CS condition and without noise (nN) (columns 1 and 2), the effect of social conformity is masked by the regularity of L 3 , because the penalization parameters c 3 β 3,j ≤ c 3 are small. In the presence of noise (N), the CS condition behaves differently because it is now possible that everyone ends up using L 3 , hence the configuration 222. In this situation (N, CS, columns 3 and 4), the effect of conformity (C) appears as it should as a bias towards L 1 , diminishing the probability of the 222 configuration. In this configuration, the competition between the two effects is so strong that 3% of the simulations did not converge.
The best match of our results with the ALL experiment data (Tinits, 2013) corresponds to column 2, where there is no noise (nN) and conformity (C) is taken into account. This case matches the trend apparent in the data of the ALL experiment where CC minority almost fully accommodated to the majority and where CS minority kept their taught language. In the real experiment the majority didn't become real bilinguals: they ended up understanding the minority language but kept using their taught language. This behavior corresponds to passive bilingualism as described in (Lincoln, 1979) . Our model is too simple to model it, but it is in principle possible to modify it to take this situation into account.
In the communities interpretation of our experiment, we have three interacting groups where one uses a different language. The results (column 4) suggest that a small community using a complex language tends to keep it inside the community and use the majority language to interact with others. However, a small community using a simple language will continue using it, forcing the majority to adapt and turning the L 3 language into the majority. This corresponds very well to the results of Lupyan and Dale (2010) where the languages of large communities tend to be simpler. Our results suggest that if there exists a minority language simpler than the majority language, it will propagate and turn into the majority language.
Conclusions and outlook
We have shown in this paper that a simple evolutionary game is able to capture the dynamics of an ALL communication task and have argued that the competition between social conformism and language simplification was the main mechanism underlying its dynamics. This leads to the emergence of bilingualism situations comparable with those studied by Lupyan and Dale (2010) ; languages spoken by large communities tend to be simpler than those spoken by small communities.
Although we worked in a very simple framework we got satisfying results. This model can be improved in many ways. First, one can allow the subjective biases to evolve, which will more accurately account for social conformism as the majority language may change. Second, we could apply the framework on larger networks using more complex languages (not restricted to one word) and allow languages themselves to evolve (creating new signals or deleting some). Third, we could study the influence of the direction of communication by removing some of the directed edges and more accurately modeling the interaction by using a signaling game instead of a coordination game. This could provide a good model of the influence of social media like radio, television or literature on language evolution as social media can be modeled by a vertex with only outgoing edges.
